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ABSTRACT
Understanding the severity of vulnerabilities within cloud
services is particularly important for today’s service admin-
istrators. Although many systems, e.g., CVSS, have been
built to evaluate and score the severity of vulnerabilities for
administrators, the scoring schemes employed by these sys-
tems fail to take into account the contextual information of
specific services having these vulnerabilities, such as what
roles they play in a particular service. Such a deficiency
makes resulting scores unhelpful. This paper presents a prac-
tical framework, NCVS, that offers automatic and contextual
scoring mechanism to evaluate the severity of vulnerabili-
ties for a particular service. Specifically, for a given service
S, NCVS first automatically collects S’s contextual informa-
tion including topology, configurations, vulnerabilities and
their dependencies. Then, NCVS uses the collected informa-
tion to build a contextual dependency graph, named CDG, to
model S’s context. Finally, NCVS scores and ranks all the
vulnerabilities in S by analyzing S’s context, such as what
roles the vulnerabilities play in S, and how critical they affect
the functionality of S. NCVS is novel and useful, because 1)
context-based vulnerability scoring results are highly rele-
vant and meaningful for administrators to understand each
vulnerability’s importance specific to the target service; and
2) the workflow of NCVS does not need instrumentation or
modifications to any source code. Our experimental results
demonstrate that NCVS can obtain more relevant vulnerabil-
ity scoring results than comparable system, such as CVSS.
1. INTRODUCTION
Today’s cloud-scale systems become increasingly com-
plex – they not only employ multi-layered network/software
stacks, but also deploy various distributed service compo-
nents offered by other providers. These structurally complex
systems, nevertheless, may inadvertently introduce much more
vulnerabilities than traditional computer systems.1 There-
fore, it is important for administrators to score vulnerabili-
ties based on their severity, thus enabling administrators to
deal with the critical ones accordingly.
Driven by the above motivation, many public vulnera-
bility databases (e.g., CVE [1] and OSVDB [5]) are main-
tained, which contain classification of vulnerabilities, de-
scription of the nature of their severities, as well as the ex-
ploitability based on the feedback of security experts. Fur-
1A vulnerability is a weakness (defect) of the software design or
implementation rather than necessarily a bug; in other words, a sys-
tem may have a vulnerability due to a defective design, even if its
implementation is perfect.
thermore, several vulnerability scoring systems are also de-
veloped for the disclosure and severity ranking of vulnera-
bilities. One of the most representative vulnerability scoring
systems is Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [2],
which is designed based on expert knowledge, multi-dimension
scoring schemes and customer feedback.
However, current vulnerability scoring efforts typically
quantify the severity of vulnerabilities in a general (or global)
way – i.e., how severe vulnerabilities are – rather than con-
sidering the context of specific services holding these vul-
nerabilities. Applying such scores to evaluate the risk of a
particular service, therefore, may not always be meaningful
or instructive. For example, a denial of service vulnerability
against MySQL might have a high severity score in CVSS.
But for a particular service context, its application compo-
nents running MySQL may only be used for exception event
logging, which is rarely invoked. Thus, the impact of this
vulnerability on the whole service context would not be as
significant as the ranking score suggested in CVSS. On the
contrary, if a service context has to rely on such legacy sys-
tems for its core functionality, their vulnerabilities should be
ranked high and handled with high priority.
Based on this insight, for a particular service administra-
tor, it is desirable to have a tool, which not only considers
the properties of vulnerabilities, but more importantly takes
into account the target service’s context. Such a tool can of-
fer a truly meaningful severity score for each vulnerability
to serve as a guideline regarding which vulnerabilities are
the most urgent and critical ones for that particular service,
thus enabling administrators to allocate appropriate patches
or fixing code to deal with them accordingly. Although many
efforts (e.g., attack graph approaches [13,15,24,33] and pro-
filing techniques [34, 38]), these efforts are either ad hoc or
hard to be extended to tackle our problem (see §2.2 for more
details).
This paper presents a systematic work, NCVS, which is
a practical contextual vulnerability scoring framework for
cloud services. To evaluate the severity of vulnerabilities in
terms of a particular service context, NCVS first automati-
cally collects contextual information about service compo-
nents and their dependencies in a comprehensive way. Us-
ing this acquired data, NCVS then builds a contextual de-
pendency graph, named CDG, to model the service’s con-
text. Finally, NCVS analyzes all the vulnerabilities’ relative
importance in this context and returns a contextual vulnera-
bility scoring report. To the best of our knowledge, NCVS
is the first effort capable of offering automatic (i.e., non-
intrusive) and context-aware vulnerability scoring for cloud
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services.
Building a non-intrusive system for contextual vulnerabil-
ity scoring needs to address several challenges. First, the in-
formation of components in the target cloud service and their
associated dependencies should be comprehensively acquired,
since vulnerabilities may exist in different types of compo-
nents. In addition, infrastructures underlying today’s ser-
vices tend to be complex; thus, asking an administrator to
manually collect such a large dataset is an infeasible task.
Existing techniques either heavily rely on interruptive in-
strumentations (e.g., MagPie [9] and Project 5 [7]), or have
been developed for limited types of dependencies (e.g., Sher-
lock [8] and NSDMiner [14, 20]). Thus, how to comprehen-
sively acquire the detailed contextual dependencies (includ-
ing network, hardware and software-level dependencies) with-
out instrumentations presents a challenge. We develop a
non-intrusive approach capable of collecting three types of
contextual information by mining log information and net-
work traffic (detailed in §3.2).
The second challenge includes 1) how to model the con-
text with the collected information and 2) how to compute
the importance of each vulnerability by taking into account
this context. We propose a new representation, named con-
textual dependency graph (or CDG), to model the target ser-
vice’s context. In general, CDG is a two-layered directed
acyclic graph (DAG) representation, and is capable of cap-
turing more details than previous dependency graph models.
With CDG in hand, we propose a pluggable scoring mod-
ule that allows administrators to apply diverse (existing or
customized) ranking algorithms based on their requirements.
As an example, we also propose a new algorithm specific to
our CDG model by adapting PageRank algorithm [23]. Our
experimental results indicate the new algorithm can obtain
more reasonable vulnerabilities’ scores than CVSS (detailed
in §3.3).
In summary, this paper mainly makes four contributions.
First, we present the first practical (i.e., general, non-intrusive,
pluggable and effective) contextual vulnerability scoring frame-
work for cloud services. Second, we develop a set of col-
lectors capable of automatically acquiring a target cloud ser-
vice’s contextual information, including network, service and
hardware dependencies. Third, we construct a new graph
model, named CDG, specific to our collected information
and vulnerability scoring purpose. Finally, we demonstrate
the practicality of NCVS based on a lab-scale case study and
performance measurements.
2. MOTIVATION AND RELATEDWORK
This section first motivates our work (§2.1), and then dis-
cusses why existing work does not help (§2.2).
2.1 Motivating Example
Figure 1 presents a simple but illustrative example for
our motivation. In this example, we consider a real-world
lab-scale Hadoop cluster with eight servers: one name node
S1
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Figure 1: Motivating example.
(S1), one backup name node (S5), and six data nodes (S2-S4,
and S6-S8). The name nodes and data nodes run job trackers
and task trackers, respectively. S1-S4 and S5-S8 belong to
two individual racks, respectively. Each rack has one edge
switch [29, 37].
By retrieving one of the most representative vulnerabil-
ity scoring systems, Common Vulnerability Scoring System
(CVSS) [2], the administrator discovers two vulnerabilities
in this cluster: 1) Hadoop name node vulnerability, CVE-
2015-7430, with severity score 8.4; and 2) core switch vul-
nerability, CVE-2016-1392, with severity score 7.4. In the
example of Figure 1, the former exists in Hadoop compo-
nents running in S1 and S5, while the later exists in Core1
switch software. If this administrator prioritizes her fixing
or patching vulnerabilities based upon the scores provided
by CVSS, she should fix Hadoop vulnerability first. Nev-
ertheless, if we deeply analyze the given Hadoop cluster,
we may find that the states of name nodes in this Hadoop
cluster have been replicated across two servers (i.e., S1 and
S5). Even though the vulnerability CVE-2015-7430 is trig-
gered on one name node (e.g., S1), the service can use S5 –
the backup name node – to manage all data nodes. On the
contrary, if the vulnerability CVE-2016-1392 is triggered,
any network traffic from external network cannot reach any
servers in this cluster.
Based on the above example, we note that existing vulner-
ability scoring systems fail to guide administrators to under-
stand the severity of vulnerabilities in their service deploy-
ments. In other words, because existing vulnerability scor-
ing systems do not take into account contextual information
of target vulnerabilities, severity scores offered by these sys-
tems are not truly helpful in practice. Thus, we raise a ques-
tion that whether it is possible to build a practical contextual
vulnerability scoring system?
This paper develops such a system, named NCVS. In Fig-
ure 1 example, if the administrator uses NCVS to score the
two revealed vulnerabilities, she can obtain a different result:
CVE-2016-1392 has a higher severity score than CVE-2015-
7430 in terms of service context as shown in Figure 1.
2
2.2 Existing Efforts Discussions
We now describe and compare existing efforts, and dis-
cuss why they do not work for our purpose.
Vulnerability scoring systems. Many current vulnerability
scoring systems (e.g., CVSS [2], OSVDB [5] and OVAL [4])
have been developed to score vulnerabilities based on their
severity. However, these systems only score vulnerabilities
generally, i.e., how severe they are by themselves without
considering any specific environment. Such a score is not
meaningful or instructive to evaluate vulnerabilities in spe-
cific service context (like the example in §2.1).
Although several contextual vulnerability scoring efforts,
e.g., improved CVSS [3,11] and VRank [15], have been pro-
posed, they are quite ad hoc and impractical. First, these ef-
forts do not have any automatic environmental information
collection capability. This means all the contextual infor-
mation has to be input manually, making their scoring pro-
cess impractical to any complex services. Second, these ap-
proaches only support coarse-grained scoring schemes, be-
cause they lack expressive models. Finally, the environmen-
tal factors considered by these efforts are too simple to rep-
resent the contexts of real-world services.
Attack graph based risk evaluation efforts. Attack graph
based risk reasoning approaches [13, 21, 22, 24] have been
studied in the past ten years. An attack graph is an abstrac-
tion of the details of possible attacks against any computer
system or service. Attack graph based efforts are appropriate
to evaluate the potential risks of target services, rather than
computing vulnerabilities’ severity. In other words, attack
graph techniques leverage existing vulnerability scores (e.g.,
provided by CVSS) to compute the risks of services of inter-
est, but it is not capable of updating vulnerabilities’ scores
based on different services’ contexts.
3. NCVS DESIGN
This section first presents a high-level overview of NCVS
framework in §3.1. Then, we detail two important modules
in §3.2 and §3.3, respectively.
3.1 NCVS Framework Overview
As shown in Figure 2, NCVS has two important mod-
ules: 1) contextual information acquisition module and 2)
vulnerability scoring module. In addition, NCVS relies on
two databases – contextual information DB and vulnerability
threats DB – that are used to provide necessary information
for vulnerability scoring.
NCVS performs the following two steps to score vulnera-
bilities for a target cloud service S.
Step 1: NCVS’s contextual information acquisition module
automatically collects comprehensive dependency informa-
tion, including topology, service deployment, and correla-
tions between components. Then, the module stores the col-
lected information into the contextual information DB for
post processing. All the operations within this step do not
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Figure 2: NCVS’s architecture overview.
require any additional instrumentations from administrators.
§3.2 discusses this module’s design in more detail.
Step 2: The vulnerability scoring module takes the infor-
mation in the contextual information DB and vulnerability
threats DB as input, and constructs a dependency graph, named
CDG, modeling the context of the target service S. While
various graphs representing service structures have been pro-
posed in the past years, CDG is the first effort capable of
capturing comprehensive contextual information. With the
CDG in hand, the module analyzes it and outputs a report
ranking vulnerabilities based on their scores specific to the
context of the target service S. §3.3 details this module.
3.2 Contextual Information Acquisition
For a target service S, NCVS’s contextual information ac-
quisition module automatically collects three types of de-
pendency information (network dependency, hardware de-
pendency and software dependency), and then stores the col-
lected information into the contextual information database
(as shown in Figure 2). We focus on the collection of these
three types of contextual information, since this information
is able to comprehensively represent a service’s context (or
environment) [30, 31]. To our knowledge, there is no exist-
ing effort that can simultaneously collect these three types of
dependency information without any instrumentation.
Hardware dependency means S’s physical topology infor-
mation, including the locations of servers and network de-
vices (e.g., aggregation switches and core routers) as well
as the links between servers and network devices. In other
words, hardware dependency information is the data-center
infrastructure components and their links used to support
service S [35].
Software dependency denotes software components run-
ning on each node (e.g., server or switch). For switches,
the software components might be the switch OS and re-
lated embed functional applications; for servers, the soft-
ware components include operating systems, service S’s com-
ponents (e.g., back-end DB), and needed applications (e.g.,
SSH) [17, 25–28, 32, 36].
Network dependency means an invoking sequence (or flow)
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between different software components in the target service
S. For example in a MapReduce service, a request is first
sent to a job tracker and then arrives at several task track-
ers, forming a directed invoking flow. Such an invoking se-
quence, e.g., Client -> JobTracker -> TaskTrackers, repre-
sents an item of network dependency information. Different
from hardware dependency, network dependency is at logi-
cal level, which means a network dependency (i.e., an invok-
ing flow) may be across different servers or only occurs on
the same server.
As described in the introduction section, the first chal-
lenge of building NCVS is how to acquire all of the above
three types of information without any instruments or mod-
ifications to the source code of target services. We now de-
scribe how we develop the contextual information acquisi-
tion module.
Software dependency collection. The basic idea of soft-
ware dependency collector is to determine software compo-
nents running on each node (e.g., server or switch) by an-
alyzing the node’s log information during a service request
session. A software dependency is defined as <node="M"
sw="S" dep="x,y,z"/>, where node indicates the node
running (or holding) this software component specified by
sw, and dep shows all the components (e.g., libraries) used
by this software component sw.
Our insight for designing the software dependency col-
lector is: when a request is sent to the target service S, each
involved node would generate log corresponding to its func-
tions, and the log information across all the nodes has a time-
aware sequence. Thus, if we can capture and analyze all the
involved nodes’ log information between the start time and
end time of accessing S, we would be able to extract the soft-
ware dependency information of each node supporting S. In
our design, therefore, the software dependency collector –
playing as a client role – sends many requests to the tar-
get service S and infers software dependencies of each node
by analyzing the generated log during the session. The col-
lector employs a well-known association rule mining algo-
rithm, named Apriori [6], that first groups each item of log
information by a time interval, then mines correlated rules
among log items with confidence values, and finally selects
these correlations with the high confidence level as software
dependencies. The accuracy of collector is related to the
threshold of time interval we set – smaller threshold gives
better accuracy.
Network dependency collection. In order to automatically
acquire needed network dependency information, we design
a network dependency collector based on the similar intu-
ition as the software dependency collector. In particular,
we define a network dependency as a continuous, directed
stream of packets between two services (or applications).
Similar to the software dependency collector, the network
dependency collector also sends many requests to the target
service S, but it aims to capture all the networking packets
and flows during the service access session. To capture these
traffics, our collector employs NSDMiner [14, 20], which is
a well-developed traffic monitor. An important reason we
choose NSDMiner is that NSDMiner does not need to in-
stall extra agents or software on involved nodes; moreover,
NSDMiner can collect more accurate traffic, thus making
our network dependency collector work better than Sher-
lock [8] and Orion [10], two representative network depen-
dency collection tools. The network dependency collector
outputs many items of the network dependency information
formatted as follows:
<IP address A>:<port A>:[TCP] <# App~1>
<IP address B> <port B> [TCP]
<IP address D> <port D> [TCP]
<IP address B>:<port B>:[UDP] <# App~2>
<IP address C> <port C> [UDP]
<IP address D> <port D> [UDP]
...
This example shows that component A which runs on IP
address A at port A depends on components B and D which
run on their respective IP addresses and ports. Similarly,
component B depends on component C and D. Note that all
the components (A,B,C and D) are services or applications.
Hardware dependency collection. Since most of current
data-center networks employ software defined network (SDN)
controller [18] or network provenance techniques [39, 40],
it is easy for the administrators to learn physical network
topology (i.e., hardware dependency information for our sys-
tem). Thus, if an administrator has known network topol-
ogy, our hardware dependency collector would directly read
and parse the network topology file that might be written
in different formats (e.g., CSV or XML), thus obtaining our
needed hardware dependency information.
In the case that there is no such file available, we also
provide a network topology generation toolkit (TopoGen)
to assist administrators to derive the network topology in a
fast, less tedious way. TopoGen supports various data-center
topology models including fat tree [19] and BCube [12].
The administrators only need to give the basic information,
i.e., the number of core/aggregation/edge switches, to To-
poGen, and then TopoGen generates a network topology au-
tomatically. Administrators are allowed to validate the auto-
generated topology and further modify if necessary. Further-
more, TopoGen allows users to plug new topology genera-
tion rules into generate network links, which is very efficient
and helpful for large-scale network systems. Thus, combin-
ing with our TopoGen toolkit and the basic information from
cloud administrators, we can derive accurate network topol-
ogy information in a less tedious manner.
3.3 Vulnerability Scoring
Vulnerability scoring module computes the contextual score
of each vulnerability in S by two steps: 1) modeling S’s con-
text with the contextual information acquired in §3.2, and 2)
computing the importance of each vulnerability in terms of
this model.
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3.3.1 Contextual Dependency Graph (CDG)
The vulnerability scoring module first needs to build an
explicit graph, named contextual dependency graph (or CDG),
to represent the context of the target service S. Figure 3
presents a CDG example.
In a CDG, there are two layers: hardware (physical) layer
and software (logical) layer. All the nodes representing phys-
ical components (e.g., servers and switches) are involved in
the hardware layer; on the contrary, all the nodes represent-
ing software components (e.g., libraries and applications) are
put in the software layer. All the edges in the CDG are di-
rected. An edge like A→ B means component A depends on
another component B.
Because our contextual information acquisition module
automatically collects hardware, software and network de-
pendency information, we now describe the correlation be-
tween the collected contextual information and a CDG. All
the hardware components (e.g., servers and switches) and
their dependencies (e.g., links) are modeled as CDG nodes
in the hardware layer and directed edges among them, re-
spectively. In other words, a directed edge between two
CDG nodes in the hardware layer means a physical topol-
ogy link. All the software dependencies of each machine are
modeled as CDG nodes in the software layer, and they are
connected by directed edges to their corresponding nodes in
the hardware layer, as shown in Figure 3. Namely, a di-
rected edge across the hardware layer and the software layer
in a CDG means a software dependency. All the network
dependencies are modeled as directed edges connecting dif-
ferent CDG nodes in the software layer. Namely, a directed
edge between two CDG nodes in the software layer means a
network dependency.
3.3.2 Vulnerabilities’ Scores Computation
With a CDG in hand, the vulnerability scoring module
now aims to identify what nodes have vulnerabilities in the
CDG and score these identified vulnerabilities by taking into
account their “roles” in this CDG. As shown in Figure 2,
the vulnerability scoring module relies on another database,
named vulnerability threats DB. The vulnerability threats
DB could be any existing vulnerability scoring system – our
prototype employs CVSS. We need such a database because
it can offer exploited vulnerabilities and their basic threats
given by security experts.
Identify involved vulnerabilities. The vulnerability scor-
ing module first uses the node information in CDG to search
vulnerabilities involved in the service S’s deployment. In our
prototype, we implemented keyword matching and classifi-
cation methods to identify involved vulnerabilities in CVSS,
since CVSS provides detailed information about each recorded
vulnerability such as its software name, threat, and impact.
Note that because almost of all the vulnerability databases
store software vulnerabilities, NCVS also focuses on soft-
ware vulnerabilities rather than hardware vulnerabilities.
Node ranking by considering context. After determining
the involved vulnerabilities in the CDG, we start to score
nodes and vulnerabilities in our target context. Specifically,
for each affected software node n in CDG, we compute its
importance in terms of three different sub-graphs in CDG:
• Topology-aware importance ti(n) = Rank(hw_graph,n),
where hw_graph means the nodes that are located at the
hardware layer and have software component n.
• Software-aware importance si(n) = Rank(sw_graph,n),
where sw_graph means the nodes that are located at the
software layer and have software component n.
• Network-aware important ni(n)=Rank(net_graph,n), where
net_graph means the nodes that are involved in network
dependencies and have software component n.
In the above computation, Rank() means graph node rank-
ing function. In our prototype, we adopt PageRank algo-
rithm [23] to enable the graph node ranking function, i.e.,
computing the importance of the node n. Our prototype sup-
ports any graph node ranking algorithm, including PageR-
ank, HITs [16] and new developed ranking algorithms.
Ranking vulnerabilities. With the importance of each soft-
ware node in hand, we can compute the contextual scores
for vulnerabilities involved in our target service S. In partic-
ular, for a given vulnerability v, we compute the score of v,
severity(v), as follows.
severity(v) = wti ∗
|Sv|
∑
i=1
ti(ni)+wni ∗
|Sv|
∑
i=1
ni(ni)+wsi ∗
|Sv|
∑
i=1
si(ni)
Where, Sv means the set of software nodes that contain the
vulnerability v. wti, wni and wsi are used to weight the three
types of context impacts, respectively. These weights are
first assigned based on expert knowledge and further tuned
in an iterative process. For example, we can start with equal
importance for three contexts wti = wni = wli = 1 and adjust
these weights to control the score until the final scores are
reasonable. The design of the aggregation function is also
pluggable, which means developers can customize their ag-
gregate function according to their particular purpose. For
example, in our prototype, we also provide another aggre-
gate function to integrate CVSS score based on the product
rule: severity(v) = (∑|Sv|i=1 ti(ni) ∗ ni(ni) ∗ si(ni)) ∗CV SS(v).
In this aggregate function, CVSS score is considered as a
local software importance factor.
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Figure 4: Performance evaluation: (a) contextual informa-
tion acquisition module, and (b) vulnerability scoring mod-
ule.
4. EVALUATION
We have developed a prototype system in Java to evalu-
ate NCVS. In this section, we first evaluate NCVS’s perfor-
mance (§4.1), and then evaluate the effectiveness of NCVS
with a real-world case study (§4.2).
4.1 Performance Evaluation
We deploy our NCVS prototype on a workstation equipped
with Intel Xeon E5-2630 2.30 GHz CPU and 64 GB RAM.
For performance evaluation, we measure the performance of
two modules of our NCVS prototype – i.e., the runtime for
two modules to handle different sizes of services.
First, we evaluate the runtime of the first module of NCVS,
i.e., contextual information acquisition module. The perfor-
mance bottlenecks of this module are software dependency
collector and network dependency collector, so that our ex-
periments focus on these two collectors.
Figure 4(a) presents the evaluational results for software
and network dependency collectors. In particular, we vary
the size of target services, thus getting raw datasets with dif-
ferent sizes (reflected by the x-axis of Figure 4(a)). Then,
we measured how long two modules need to extract depen-
dency information of interest. As shown in Figure 4(a), the
runtime of two collectors increases with the dataset size, but
the software dependency collector is more expensive due to
the complexity of Apriori algorithm. It is worth mention-
ing that the increase in runtime over the size of services is
acceptable in practice, since such a process is typically op-
erated off-line and the results could be re-used in the future.
On the right hand, Figure 4(b) shows that the runtime of
vulnerability ranking algorithm (the performance bottleneck
of the vulnerability scoring module) increases with the num-
ber of nodes in the CDG. We can observe that NCVS is quite
efficient, with less than 12 seconds ranking 100,000 nodes.
Our ranking algorithm is powered by PageRank algorithm
which is highly efficient for large-scale graphs (here we set
the maximum number of iteration is 100 and the error toler-
ance of two consecutive iterations is 0.001).
4.2 Case Study
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of NCVS, we con-
Table 1: Comparing the vulnerability scores output by CVSS
and NCVS in our case study. The fourth column in this table
contains scores produced by CVSS, while the fifth column
includes NCVS’s scores for our evaluated vulnerabilities.
Seq ID Type CVSS NCVS
1 CVE-2015-1776 Hadoop 6.3 0.0257
2 CVE-2015-4279 Network 7.8 0.1069
3 CVE-2015-5210 Hadoop 5.8 0.0275
4 CVE-2015-6355 Network 5.0 0.0403
5 CVE-2015-6415 Network 7.1 0.0770
6 CVE-2015-6420 Hadoop 7.5 0.0287
7 CVE-2015-7430 Hadoop 8.4 0.0293
8 CVE-2016-0731 Hadoop 4.9 0.0269
9 CVE-2016-1503 Network 9.8 0.0789
10 CVE-2016-2170 Hadoop 9.8 0.0303
struct a real-world case study similar to our motivating ex-
ample (in §2.1). In the case study, we deploy a Hadoop ser-
vice on a lab-scale cluster with 16 server machines and 8
switches. The CDG generated by NCVS to model this ser-
vice contains 747 nodes and 1204 dependencies. As shown
in Table 1, we extract ten vulnerabilities from this service
and derive their scores from CVSS (the fourth column in
Table 1). We observe that the vulnerabilities 2, 4, 5, 9 are
network-related and located in the switches, while the re-
maining ones are vulnerabilities of Hadoop and its related
libraries (e.g., Apache common library). The fifth column in
Table 1 shows these ten vulnerabilities’ scores produced by
NCVS.
In Table 1, we observe that if we fix these vulnerabili-
ties based on the scores output by CVSS, the order should
be 10 -> 9 -> 7 -> 2 -> 6 -> 5 -> 1 -> 3 -> 4 -> 8. On
the contrary, if we fix vulnerabilities according to the scores
output by NCVS, the order should be 2 -> 9 -> 5 -> 4 ->
10 -> 7 -> 6 -> 3 -> 8 -> 1. To demonstrate NCVS’s effec-
tiveness, we construct an interesting “vulnerability fixing”
experiment. We assume that the current cluster is compro-
mised by these ten vulnerabilities and all 16 server machines
are not alive. Now, we fix these vulnerabilities based on the
above two orders output by CVSS and NCVS, respectively.
At each time point t, we only fix one vulnerability. After
each time point, we evaluate the system in terms of the num-
ber of alive nodes in the cluster (as a safety metric). Figure 5
shows our experimental results. We observe that fixing vul-
nerabilities according to the scores output by NCVS can re-
cover the capability of the Hadoop cluster much faster than
fixing vulnerabilities based on CVSS ranking list. Thus, we
can say NCVS can output more meaningful vulnerabilities’
scores than CVSS since NCVS takes into account the con-
text of the target service.
In addition, NCVS’s results have the following advan-
tages. First, the result is network topology aware. We ob-
serve that network-related vulnerabilities in NCVS’s rank-
ing are generally higher than that of CVSS ranking list. Sec-
ond, the result can distinguish the roles of different software
components. We observe that the vulnerability (i.e., CVE-
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Figure 5: Comparison of two different fix plans.
2015-7430) that affect master nodes ranks higher than that
that affect slave nodes (i.e., CVE-2015-1776). Finally, the
result is accurate. In the case that two vulnerabilities are
located in the same software component (e.g., CVE-2015-
6420 and CVE-2016-2170), their severity ordering depend
on their scores in CVSS, which means NCVS does not vio-
late the basic severity of each vulnerability.
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose, design, implement and evalu-
ate a novel framework, NCVS, that can automatically score
vulnerabilities for cloud services. Different from existing ef-
forts, NCVS’s workflow is non-intrusive and NCVS scores
any given vulnerability by not only considering its intrinsic
threats, but also taking into account its service context. Our
evaluational results demonstrate NCVS’s effectiveness (by
comparing with CVSS) and performance.
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